On universal Free Choice items by Paula Menéndez-Benito
Abstract This paper deals with the interpretation and distribution of universal
Free Choice (FC) items, such as English FC any or Spanish cualquiera.
Crosslinguistically, universal FC items can be characterized as follows. First, they
have a restricted distribution. Second, they express freedom of choice: the sentence
You can take any card conveys the information that the addressee is free to pick
whichever card she chooses. Under standard assumptions, the truth conditions of
sentences like You can take any card are taken to be captured by formalizations in
which a universal quantifier ranging over individuals has wide scope over the possi-
bility modal. The crucial observation that informs the account in this paper is that this
type of formalization cannot capture the freedom of choice component. I will argue
that in order to derive the right interaction between possibility modals and FC items,
we need to add an exclusiveness condition to the standard wide scope paraphrases. The
same proposal that guarantees freedom of choice will automatically account for the
distribution restrictions of FC items. The formal implementation of this proposal is
cast in the Hamblin semantics proposed in Kratzer and Shimoyama (Indeterminate
phrases: The view from Japanese, 2002).
Keywords Free Choice  Indefinites  Alternatives  Exhaustivity
1 Introduction: universal Free Choice items
Across languages, we find universal Free Choice (FC) items—items that express
what Vendler (1967) dubbed ‘Freedom of Choice’ and that can be given a universal
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paraphrase.1 Both Spanish cualquiera and English any belong to this category.
By uttering the Spanish sentence in (1a) or its English counterpart in (1b) I inform
my addressee that all the cards are permitted possibilities for her; thus I grant her
‘‘the unrestricted liberty of individual choice’’ (Vendler 1967: 80). These sentences
are often paraphrased as ‘For every card x in this deck you can take x.’
(1) a. Puedes coger cualquier carta de esta baraja.
‘You can take any card from this deck.’
b. You can take any card from this deck.
Universal FC items have a restricted distribution. Crosslinguistically, they are
licensed in possibility sentences (see (1) above) and ruled out in episodic sentences
(as in (2)) and in necessity statements like (3). These items thus seem sensitive to
some property of their environment. But in view of the data in (1) through (3) it is
far from obvious what this property might be: looking at the contrast between (1)
and (2) one might think that the relevant property is modality (that is, that universal
FC items are ‘modality-sensitive’ elements). But as (3) shows, not any type of
modal will do.
(2) a. *Juan cogio´ cualquiera de las cartas de esta baraja.
‘Juan took-pfv. any of the cards from this deck.’
b. *John took any of the cards from this deck.
(3) a. *Juan tiene que coger cualquiera de las cartas de esta baraja.
‘Juan must take any of the cards from this deck.’
b. *John must take any of the cards from this deck.
While universal FC items seem to involve quantification, they don’t behave like
‘textbook’ quantifiers. As illustrated by the examples above, they have a puzzling
distribution and they have obligatory wide scope with respect to possibility modals.
An analysis of these items is thus likely to contribute insights into the properties of
quantification in natural language. Much current research aims to provide such an
analysis (see e.g., Aloni 2003, 2007a, b; Abrusa´n 2007a; Arregui 2006; Dayal 1998,
2004; Chierchia 2006; Farkas 2006; Giannakidou 2001; Giannakidou and Cheng
2006; Horn 2000, 2005; Jayez and Tovena 2005; Quer 1998, 2000; Sæbø 2001,
among others). Many of these proposals share the assumption that the truth con-
ditions of possibility sentences like (1) above can be captured by wide scope uni-
versal formalizations such as ‘For every x such that x is a card in this deck, you may
take x.’ A number of different ways of deriving paraphrases that essentially boil
down to this structure have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., Aloni 2003,
2007a; Dayal 1998, 2004; Chierchia 2006; Sæbø 2001). The crucial observation that
informs the account in this paper is that—surprisingly—this type of formalization
1 Until relatively recently the term ‘Free Choice Item’ has been reserved for items of the any-type, which
have a universal interpretation. Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) have shown that some existential inde-
finites (e.g., German irgendein) also have a FC component. Most of the FC literature now differentiates
between Existential FC items (irgendein and its kin) and Universal (any-like) FC items.
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cannot capture the freedom of choice component. I will argue that in order to derive
the right interaction between possibility modals and FC items we need to add an
exclusiveness condition to the standard wide scope universal paraphrases. Once this
proposal has been implemented, both the ungrammaticality of the FC items in (2)
and (3) and their obligatory wide scope in (1) will fall out automatically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to capturing the FC
effect. In Sect. 2.1 I argue that wide scope universal paraphrases do not guarantee
freedom of choice. Section 2.2 shows how this problem can be overcome by adding
an exclusiveness condition and Sect. 2.3 puts forward a compositional implemen-
tation of this idea, cast in Kratzer and Shimoyama’s Hamblin semantics (Kratzer
and Shimoyama 2002). Section 3 shows that the proposal developed in 2.3 accounts
for the distributional restrictions of FC items exemplified above. In Sect. 4, I briefly
discuss some of the questions raised by the proposal. Section 5 deals with necessity
sentences that, unlike (3) above, license universal FC items (e.g., Any student must
work hard). Section 6 discusses the repair strategy dubbed ‘subtrigging’ in LeGrand
(1975). Finally, Sect. 7 presents some issues for further research.
2 Accounting for the Free Choice effect
2.1 Wide scope universal quantification does not guarantee Free Choice
One of the central questions of research on FC items of the any-type has been how
to derive their universal flavor. Kadmon and Landman (1993) analyzed any as an
indefinite that gets a universal-like interpretation in generic contexts. However,
Dayal (1998) convincingly argued that FC any does not pattern with generic in-
definites, and proposed instead that this item is a universal quantifier that ranges
over possible individuals. On Sæbø’s (2001) analysis, Scandinavian FC items also
contribute a universal determiner as part of their meaning. A different view is put
forward in Aloni (2003, 2007a), where the universal interpretation we see in sen-
tences like Anyone may enter comes about because the possibility modal introduces
universal quantification over propositions. Chierchia (2006) treats FC items as
existential quantifiers and claims that their apparent universal force results from
combining the existential assertion with a domain widening implicature (in the spirit
of Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). This list, while by no means exhaustive, illus-
trates the wide range of proposals that have been entertained in the literature.
While analyses differ widely with respect to the source of the universal inter-
pretation, there is widespread agreement that the truth conditions of possibility
sentences like (4) below2 correspond to formalizations in which a universal quan-
tifier ranging over individuals has scope over the possibility modal.3 On this view,
(4) would denote the proposition in (5) below.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, the judgments reported here obtain both for cualquiera and FC any. For
reasons of space, in Sects. 2 and 3 I will provide only Spanish examples.
3 Some exceptions are Giannakidou (2001) as well as Abrusa´n (2007a) and Aloni (2007b), both of whom
build on Mene´ndez-Benito (2005).
On universal Free Choice items 35
123
(4) Puedes coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘You can take any of the cards in the discard pile.’
(5) The proposition that is true in a world w iff for every x such that x is a
combination of cards in the discard pile, there is a world accessible from
w in which you take x.4
Surprisingly, however, wide scope universal paraphrases yield wrong truth-conditions
for sentences like (4). By adopting formalizations like (5) we would predict (4) to be
true in situations where there is no complete freedom of choice. To see why, consider
the following scenario.
The Canasta scenario5
One of the rules of the card game Canasta is: When a player has two cards that
match the top card of the discard pile, she has two options: (i) take all the cards
in the discard pile and (ii) take no card from the discard pile (but take the top
card of the regular pile instead). Those are her two only options.
Now, consider the sentence in (6). Is this sentence true in the scenario above?
(6) En Canasta, puedes coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo cuando tienes
dos cartas que son del mismo palo que la de arriba del mazo.
‘In Canasta, you can take any of the cards in the discard pile when you
have two cards that match its top card.’
No. Given the rules of Canasta, the sentence in (6) is clearly false (you do not have
‘‘unrestricted liberty’’!). However, the formalization in (5) predicts (6) to be true in
the Canasta scenario. Let us see why.
Suppose that you are playing Canasta and have two cards that match the top card
of the discard pile. Assume further that the only cards left in the discard pile are the
Queen of Hearts and the Ace of Spades. Then, there are two types of worlds that are
permissible for you, namely:
(7) Type 1 worlds: worlds in which you take both the Queen and the Ace
Type 2 worlds: worlds in which you take no card from the discard pile
Given the paraphrase in (5), the sentence in (8) will be true in the actual world, w0,
if and only if the three conditions in (9) are satisfied.
(8) Puedes coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘You can take any of the cards in the discard pile.’
4 Here, I am using the informal term ‘combination of cards’ to cover both individual cards and sums of
cards (Link 1983).




(9) (i) There is a world accessible from w0 in which you take the Queen.
(ii) There is a world accessible from w0 in which you take the Ace.
(iii) There is a world accessible from w0 in which you take the Queen
and the Ace.
These three conditions are indeed met in the situation described in (7), where (i)
there are worlds accessible from w0 in which you take the Queen, namely all the
type 1 worlds; (ii) there are worlds accessible from w0 in which you take the Ace,
again all the type 1 worlds; and (iii) there are worlds accessible from w0 in which
you take the Queen and the Ace (the type 1 worlds, once more).
Standard wide scope paraphrases, then, predict possibility sentences like (8) to be
true in a situation where there is no freedom of choice. The following scenario
illustrates the same point.
The competition scenario
To enter a certain competition, you must answer at least three questions out of
a list of four. You can choose which questions you answer.
Now, consider the sentence in (10).
(10) Para participar en la competicio´n, puedes contestar cualquier combinacio´n
de esas preguntas.
‘To enter the competition, you can answer any combination of those
questions.’
This sentence is false in the above scenario: given the rules of the competition, you
are not free to choose just two questions, for instance. However, the wide scope
universal analysis predicts the sentence to be true.
Given this scenario, your deontic alternatives look as follows:
(11) Type 1 worlds: you answer questions 1, 2, 3
Type 2 worlds: you answer questions 1, 3, 4
Type 3 worlds: you answer questions 1, 4, 2
Type 4 worlds: you answer questions 2, 3, 4
Type 5 worlds: you answer questions 1, 2, 3, 4
On the standard wide scope universal analysis, the relevant portion of (10) would
denote the proposition in (12).
(12) The proposition that is true in a world w iff for every x such that x is a
combination of questions, there is a world accessible from w in which
you answer x.
And the proposition in (12) is indeed true in our scenario, which satisfies the three
conditions below.
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(i) There is an accessible world where you answer all the questions
(all the Type 5 worlds).
(ii) For each combination x of three questions, there is an accessible world
in which you answer x:
There is an accessible world in which you answer 1, 2, and 3
(e.g., Type 1 worlds)
There is an accessible world in which you answer 1, 3, and 4
(e.g., Type 2 worlds)
There is an accessible world in which you answer 1, 4, and 2
(e.g., Type 3 worlds)
There is an accessible world in which you answer 2, 3, and 4
(e.g., Type 4 worlds)
(iii) For each combination x of two questions, there is an accessible world
in which you answer x:
There is an accessible world in which you answer 1 and 2
(e.g., Type 1 worlds)
There is an accessible world in which you answer 1 and 3
(e.g., Type 1 worlds)
There is an accessible world in which you answer 1 and 4
(e.g., Type 2 worlds)
. . . and so on for all the combinations of two cards.
The examples above show that a standard wide scope universal account yields
wrong truth conditions for possibility sentences that contain cualquiera—it predicts
them to be true in cases where freedom of choice is limited.
2.2 The solution: exclusiveness
As we have seen, the paraphrase in (14) does not correctly capture the truth-
conditions of (13) because it does not guarantee that for every card there is a
distinct world in which you take that card. I contend that this problem can
be overcome by adding an exclusiveness requirement to standard wide scope
universal paraphrases. On this proposal, (13) will be assigned the denotation in
(15).
(13) Puedes coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘You can take any of the cards in the discard pile.’
(14) The proposition that is true in a world w iff for every x such that x
is a combination of cards in the discard pile, there is a world accessible
from w in which you take x.
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(15) The proposition that is true in a world w iff for every x such that x is a
combination of cards in the discard pile, there is a world accessible from
w in which you take x and no other cards that are not part of x.
This type of paraphrase gives us the desired Free Choice effect. To illustrate this, let
us go back to the scenarios above.
The Canasta scenario revisited
According to the proposal in (15), the sentence in (13) will be true in w0 (still
assuming that the Queen and the Ace are the only cards left in the pile) iff all three
conditions in (16) below are satisfied:
(16) (i) There is a world accessible from w0 in which you take the Queen but
not the Ace.
(ii) There is a world accessible from w0 in which you take the Ace but
not the Queen.
(iii) There is a world accessible from w0 in which you take the Ace and
the Queen.
The first two conditions are not met in the situation described in (7). Hence, (13) is
correctly predicted to be false in the Canasta scenario.
The competition scenario revisited
The sentence in (10), repeated below as (17), will now be paraphrased as in (18).
(17) Para participar en la competicio´n, puedes contestar cualquier combinacio´n
de esas preguntas.
‘To enter the competition, you can answer any combination of those
questions.’
(18) The proposition that is true in a world w iff for every x such that x is a
combination of those questions, there is a world accessible from w in
which you answer x and no other questions that are not part of x.
Proposition (18) is false in the competition scenario. Take, for instance, the com-
bination of questions 1 and 2: There is no accessible world in which you answer
questions 1 and 2, and no other questions.
By adding the exclusiveness requirement, we have derived Vendler’s insight: the
essential feature of (items like) any is freedom of choice. The next step will be to
introduce this requirement in a compositional fashion. The following section is
devoted to this task.
2.3 Implementing the solution
In what follows, I will show that the Hamblin semantics for indefinites developed in
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) allows us to introduce the exclusiveness condition
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in a principled way.6 I will start out by presenting the core features of Kratzer and
Shimoyama’s proposal (Sect. 2.3.1). Once the relevant background is in place, I will
put forward my analysis of universal FC items (Sect. 2.3.2) and show how this
analysis captures the idea informally sketched above (Sect. 2.3.3).
2.3.1 Background: Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002)
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) put forward a Hamblin semantics for indeterminate
pronouns. In this system, all expressions denote sets. Most lexical items denote
singleton sets containing their traditional denotations. For instance, the verb arrived
denotes the singleton set containing the property ‘arrived’, as in (19).
(19) [[arrived]]w,g ¼ {kxkw0 (arrived0 (x)(w0))}
Indeterminate pronouns and phrases denote sets of individual alternatives. For
instance, the denotation of a man in a world w is the set of men in w, as below.
(20) [[a man]]w,g ¼ {x: man0 (x)(w)} ¼ {Juan, Pedro, Carlos…}
Via pointwise functional application,7 the alternatives created by indeterminate
phrases can expand, i.e., give rise to alternatives of a higher type: to combine the
denotation of arrived with the denotation of a man, we apply the function in the
denotation of arrived to each of the elements in the denotation of a man. The result is
the set of propositional alternatives in (21)—that is, the set of propositions {that Juan
arrived, that Pedro arrived, that Carlos arrived…} (and so on, for all the men in the
world of evaluation).
(21) [[a man arrived]]w,g ¼ {p: $x (man0(x)(w) & p ¼ kw0(arrived0 (x)(w0)))}
The alternatives keep expanding until they meet an operator that selects them. The
denotation of the sentence A man arrived results from combining the set of prop-
ositions in (21) with the propositional operator [$] in (22), as in (23). This yields the
proposition that is true just in case at least one alternative in (21) is true (i.e., the
proposition that at least one man arrived).
(22) For any set of propositions A, [$] (A) ¼ {the proposition that is true in
all worlds in which some proposition in A is true}
(Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, 6)
6 In previous work, I explored an alternative way of introducing the exclusiveness requirement, which
makes crucial use of Fox’s (2002) Trace Conversion rule. However, this implementation commits us to
the assumption that traces can trigger the introduction of a set of alternatives, which I take to be
problematic. (It is not clear how alternatives would be introduced in the absence of focus.) See
Mene´ndez-Benito (2005) for discussion.
7 Formally, Hamblin Functional Application is defined as follows:
(i) If a is a branching node with daughters b and c, and [[b]]w,g ˝ Dr and [[c]]w,g ˝ D<rs>, then
[[a]]w,g ¼ {a ˛ Ds: $b $c [b ˛ [[b]]w,g & c ˛ [[c]]w,g & a ¼ c(b)]}.
(Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, 7)
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(23) [$] ([[a man arrived]]w,g)
Other propositional operators in Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) are:
(24) For any set of propositions A,
["] (A) ¼ {the proposition that is true in all worlds in which every
proposition in A is true}
[Neg] (A) ¼ {the proposition that is true in all worlds in which no
proposition in A is true}
[Q] (A) ¼ {A}8
Kratzer and Shimoyama draw a distinction between unselective and selective
indeterminate pronouns: the alternatives generated by unselective indeterminate
pronouns can be caught by any operator. A case in point is that of Japanese inde-
terminate pronouns, which can take on existential, universal, interrogative, negative
polarity or FC readings depending on the operator they associate with. In contrast,
other indeterminate pronouns are selective. For instance, German irgendein can only
get existential readings. In the framework presented above, this amounts to saying
that the alternatives generated by irgendein can only be operated on by [$]. To
characterize the relationship between selective indeterminates and the operators
they associate with, Kratzer (2005) proposes that selective indeterminate phrases
carry meaningless morphology that signals agreement with matching interpretable
operators.9 On this view, existential indefinites like German irgendein would
associate with [$], interrogative indefinites with [Q], and n-words in negative
concord languages with [Neg].
Let us now see how the informal proposal in Sect. 2.3.1 can be implemented in
the Kratzer and Shimoyama system.
2.3.2 The proposal
The analysis of universal FC items that I will pursue has two key components. First,
I claim that universal FC items are universal indeterminate pronouns. As such, they
introduce a set of alternatives, as in (25), and must agree with the ["] propositional
quantifier in (26).10
(25) [[cualquiera de las cartas del mazo]]w,g ¼ {The Queen, the Ace,
the Queen+the Ace}
8 This operator delivers Hamblin-style denotations (Hamblin 1973). See Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002)
for the operator that delivers Groenendijk and Stokhof-type denotations (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984).
9 Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) consider a feature checking analysis instead.
10 In the analysis of FC any put forward in Aloni (2002, 2007a) indefinite pronouns also introduce sets of
propositional alternatives. On Aloni’s account, however, quantification over these alternatives comes
about in a different way than in Kratzer and Shimoyama’s proposal. Aloni (2007b) presents a view closer
to the one assumed here. Arregui (2006) also analyzes cualquiera as a Hamblin indefinite, but her
proposal differs in several crucial ways from the one put forward here.
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(26) For any set of propositions A, ["] (A) ¼ {the proposition that is true in
all worlds in which every proposition in A is true}
(Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, 6)
Existential indeterminates are by now well-documented crosslinguistically (irg-
endein and its kin11), and so are interrogative indeterminates (wh-words) and
negative indeterminates (negative concord indefinites). Within the Kratzer and
Shimoyama setup, the existence of universal indeterminates is in principle expected.
If the propositional universal quantifier is in fact available in natural language, we
expect there to be some indeterminates that must associate with it.
Second, I hypothesize that the propositional alternatives denoted by the smallest
clausal component dominating the universal FC item are mapped into a set of
mutually exclusive propositions.12 This is achieved by means of an exclusiveness
operator akin to only, defined as in (27) below.13
(27) Excl(A) ¼ {kw (p(w) & "q ((q ˛ A & q(w)) ﬁ (p  q))): p ˛ A}
p  q ¼ def"w (p(w) ﬁ q(w))
That is, if A is a set of propositions, we get Excl (A) by mapping each proposition p
in A into the proposition that is true in a world w iff p is true in w and no other
proposition in A is true in w, unless it is logically implied by p. For instance, Excl
will map the set of propositions in (28) into the set of mutually exclusive propo-
sitions in (29).
(28) A ¼ {that Juan took the Queen, that Juan took the Ace, that Juan took
the Queen and the Ace}
(29) Excl(A) ¼ {that Juan took the Queen but not the Ace,
that Juan took the Ace but not the Queen,
that Juan took the Queen and the Ace}
As we will see, the interaction between the two components above will not only
derive the FC effect, but also go a long way toward accounting for the distributional
properties of FC items.
2.3.3 Putting the pieces together
Let us first see how this proposal accounts for the truth conditions of possibility
sentences such as (30) below.
11 See Kratzer’s (2005) argument for existential concord.
12 Farkas (2006) also argues that the alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation of FC items are
mutually exclusive. A comparison between her proposal and mine is beyond the scope of this paper.
13 Several authors have posited the existence of a covert operator akin to only (see, e.g., Chierchia 2006;
Fox 2006, and references therein).
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(30) Juan puede coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘Juan can take any of the cards in the discard pile.’
The sentence in (30) will be assigned the LF in (31): I hypothesize that Excl sits
right above the first node that denotes a set of propositional alternatives, i.e., the
constituent that I have labeled IP1. (Motivating the distribution of Excl turns out to
be not an easy matter. I will discuss this issue in Sect. 4. As for why ["] is above the
possibility modal, see also Sect. 4.)
(31) [" [IP2puede [Excl [IP1Juan coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo]]]]
For simplicity, let us assume again that the only two cards left in the discard pile are
the Queen of Hearts and the Ace of Spades. Then, following Link (1983, 1991), las
cartas del mazo (‘the cards in the discard pile’) will denote the plural individual ‘the
Queen of Hearts+the Ace of Spades’. The partitive complement de las cartas del
mazo (‘of the cards in the discard pile’) will denote the property of individuals that
are part of that plural individual (Link 1991). The denotation of cualquiera de las
cartas del mazo will then be the set of individuals that satisfy the property denoted
by de las cartas del mazo—that is, (32) below.
(32) [[cualquiera de las cartas del mazo]]w,g ¼ {The Queen, the Ace,
the Queen+the Ace}
As we have seen, in the Kratzer and Shimoyama system, lexical items that do not
introduce alternatives denote singleton sets containing their traditional denotations.
So, we have:
(33) [[coger]]w,g ¼ {kxkykw0 (take0(x)(y)(w0))}
(34) [[Juan]]w,g ¼ {Juan}
Combining the denotation of the verb with the set of individual alternatives in (32)
via pointwise functional application we get the set of alternatives below:
(35) {kykw0(take0(the Queen)(y)(w0)),kykw0(take0(the Ace)(y)(w0)),
kykw0(take0(the Queen+the Ace)(y)(w0))}
Applying (35) pointwise to the denotation of Juan yields the set of propositional
alternatives in (36)—that is, {that Juan takes the Queen, that Juan takes the Ace, that
Juan takes the Queen and the Ace}.
(36) [[IP1]]
w,g ¼ {kw0(take0(the Queen)(Juan)(w0)), kw0(take0(the Ace) (Juan)(w0)),
kw0(take0(the Queen+the Ace)(Juan)(w0))}
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Applying Excl to (36), we get:
(37) {that Juan takes the Queen but not the Ace,
that Juan takes the Ace but not the Queen,
that Juan takes the Queen and the Ace}
I will assume that the possibility modal has the denotation in (38) (see below for
discussion). Combining (38) with (37), we obtain the set of alternatives in (39).
(38) [[poder]]w,g ¼ {kpkw0$w00 (acc(w0)(w00) & p(w00))}
(39) [[IP2]]
w,g =
{that there is an accessible world in which Juan takes the Queen but not
the Ace,
that there is an accessible world in which Juan takes the Ace but not
the Queen,
that there is an accessible world in which Juan takes the Queen and the Ace}
And, finally, applying ["] to the set of propositions in (39), we get the Free Choice
effect: (30) will be true in a world w iff
(i) there is a world accessible from w in which Juan takes the Queen but not the
Ace and
(ii) there is a world accessible from w in which Juan takes the Ace but not the
Queen, and
(iii) there is a world accessible from w in which Juan takes the Ace and the Queen.
This, of course, is the Free Choice effect that we were trying to derive. Now the sentence in
(30) comes out false in the Canasta scenario, in accordance with our intuitions.
As we have seen, the analysis proposed above derives the Free Choice effect in
possibility sentences. Note that, in order to achieve this result, we need to assume
that modals let the alternatives project up the tree, as in (38). This type of denotation
crucially differs from the one assumed in Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002). Fol-
lowing Heim 1982, Kratzer and Shimoyama take the scope of modal operators to be
existentially closed. In their framework, this means that the existential propositional
quantifier stops the expansion of any alternatives that are introduced below the
modal. If we assumed this, we would predict sentences like (30) to be ungram-
matical since, as illustrated schematically in (40) below, the existential proposi-
tional quantifier would create an intervention effect.14
(40) [∀ [….∃….[…. cualquiera…]
intervener 
As an anonymous reviewer points out, this makes a general prediction, namely that
the only existential quantifiers that will license universal FC items are those that
14 For discussion of intervention effects, see Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002).
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combine with their complement by pointwise functional application. Further
research is needed to explore the consequences of this prediction.
3 Deriving the distribution of Free Choice items
The very same proposal that derives the right interaction between possibility modals
and universal FC items (by guaranteeing freedom of choice) explains the
ungrammaticality of universal FC items in episodic and necessity sentences, on the
grounds that they have impossible truth conditions. This explanation relies on
Gajewski (2002), who argues that there is a formal principle of grammar that rules
out sentences that are contradictory in virtue of their logical structure.
Let us start by computing the denotation of the LF in (42), which corresponds to
the episodic sentence in (41). (For simplicity’s sake, I am not spelling out the
contribution of tense and aspect.)
(41) *Juan cogio´ cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘Juan took-pfv. any of the cards in the discard pile.’
(42) ["[Excl IP1[Juan cogio´ cualquiera de las cartas del mazo]]]
The constituent labeled IP1 denotes the set of propositional alternatives in (43).
(43) [[IP1]]
w,g ¼ {that Juan took the Queen, that Juan took the Ace,
that Juan took the Queen and the Ace}
Applying Excl to (43) we get the set of mutually exclusive propositions in (44).
(44) {that Juan took the Queen but not the Ace, that Juan took the Ace
but not the Queen, that Juan took the Queen and the Ace}
And the result of combining (44) with ["] is the singleton set containing the
proposition that is true in a world w iff every proposition in (44) is true in w. Since
all these propositions cannot be true in the same world, (41) is a contradiction! This,
I contend, accounts for its ungrammaticality (see below for discussion of this line of
explanation).
Let us now turn to the LF in (45), which corresponds to the necessity sentence in
(46).
(45) ["[tiene que[ExclIP1[Juan coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo]]]]
(46) *Juan tiene que coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘Juan must take any of the cards in the discard pile.’
Applying Excl to the denotation of IP1 yields the set of mutually incompatible
propositions in (47).
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(47) {that Juan takes the Queen but not the Ace, that Juan takes the Ace
but not the Queen that Juan takes the Queen and the Ace}
Combining the denotation of the modal in (48) with (47), we will get (49).
(48) [[tener que]]w,g ¼ {kpkw0 "w00 (acc(w0)( w00) ﬁ p(w00))}
(49) {that in all accessible worlds Juan takes the Queen but not the Ace,
that in all accessible worlds Juan takes the Ace but not the Queen,
that in all accessible worlds Juan takes the Queen and the Ace}
When we apply ["] to (49), we get (the singleton set containing) the proposition that
is true in a world w iff all the propositions in (49) are true in w. But there is no world
in which all the propositions in (49) can be true!15 Just as in the case of episodic
sentences, universal quantification over a set of mutually exclusive propositions
yields a contradiction.
The analysis in Sect. 2 also provides an explanation of why ["] must have wide
scope with respect to possibility modals. Suppose that the sentence in (50) had the
LF in (51), where ["] is below the modal.
(50) Juan puede coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
(51) [puede["[Excl [IP1Juan coger cualquiera de las cartas del mazo]]]]
Combining ["] with the set of mutually exclusive propositions denoted by [Excl
[IP1]] (see above), we get the singleton set containing the proposition that is true in
a world w iff all the propositions in (52) below are true in w. This is a contradiction:
there is no world in which all these propositions are true.
(52) {that Juan takes the Queen but not the Ace, that Juan takes the Ace but
not the Queen, that Juan takes the Queen and the Ace}
Combining this contradictory proposition with the possibility modal yields a con-
tradiction again, namely (the singleton set containing) the proposition that is true in
a world w iff there is a world accessible from w where all the propositions in (52)
are true. We can then rule out the configuration in (51) on the grounds that it
expresses a contradiction. In this way, the unavailability of narrow scope universal
readings also falls out automatically from the architecture of the system.
I have claimed that episodic sentences like (41), necessity sentences like (46) and
the narrow scope configuration in (51) are ruled out because they have contradictory
truth conditions. The idea that sentences can be rendered ungrammatical because
they express contradictions (or tautologies) has been proposed in connection with
15 An anonymous reviewer points out that, strictly speaking, all the propositions in (49) can be true in a
world w if no worlds are accessible from it. I take it that this kind of accessibility relation is not relevant
for modal quantification in natural language: quantifiers in natural language generally presuppose that
their domain is not empty.
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a number of constructions (see, e.g., Dowty 1979; Barwise and Cooper 1981;
Chierchia 1984; von Fintel 1993; Fox and Hackl 2006; Gajewski 2008a, b; Abrusa´n
2007b, 2008). As an illustration, take von Fintel’s (1993) account of exceptive
constructions. Exceptive phrases can combine with universal quantifiers but not
with existential quantifiers, as shown by (53) and (54) below. In von Fintel’s
analysis, examples like (53) are ruled out because the interaction of but with
existential quantifiers yields a contradiction. Given the semantics for but that von
Fintel proposes, (53) below entails, on the one hand, that it is not the case that a man
arrived and, on the other hand, that it is the case that a man who is not John arrived.
The conjunction of these two entailments is of course a contradiction. In contrast,
the acceptable sentence (54) triggers the entailments that it is not true that every
man arrived and that every man who is not John arrived, which can be conjoined
without contradiction.16
(53) *Some man but John arrived.
(54) Every boy but John arrived.
This line of analysis has proved rather fruitful in a number of other domains, such as
durational phrases (Dowty 1979), existential sentences (Barwise and Cooper 1981),
degree constructions (Fox and Hackl 2006), negative islands in comparatives
(Gajewski 2008a), and weak islands (Abrusa´n 2007b, 2008). However, it has to face
an obvious objection, namely that some sentences that express contradictions (or
tautologies) are perfectly grammatical. For instance:
(55) Every woman is a woman.
(56) Some male is female.
(57) John is smoking and John is not smoking.
Gajewski (2002) puts this type of analysis on more solid grounds by claiming that
there is a fundamental distinction between different types of contradictions/tautol-
ogies.17 He argues that there is a formal principle of grammar that rules out con-
tradictory and tautological sentences and that this principle applies at a level of
representation (which he dubs the ‘logical skeleton’ of the sentence) that is un-
derspecified with respect to the content of non-logical words.18 The logical skeleton
of a sentence is derived from the sentence’s LF by (i) identifying the maximal
constituents containing no logical words, and (ii) replacing each such constituent
with a distinct variable of the appropriate type. On Gajewski’s account, a sentence is
ungrammatical whenever its logical skeleton contains a constituent that is false
(or true) under every variable assignment.
16 Gajewski (2008b) extends von Fintel’s account to other, more complex cases.
17 See Chierchia (1984) for another proposal in the same spirit.
18 On Gajewski’s proposal, logical words are characterized by being permutation-invariant, as defined in
van Benthem (1989).
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To briefly illustrate Gajewski’s proposal,19 let us examine how it differentiates
between the ungrammatical contradiction in (53) and the grammatical contradiction
in (56) (see discussion in Gajewski 2002).
Consider the LF corresponding to (53), given in (58a) below. By replacing each
non-logical element with a distinct variable of the appropriate type, we get
the logical skeleton in (58b). Given von Fintel’s analysis of but, (58) comes out as
false under every variable assignment and, therefore, (53) is correctly predicted to
be ungrammatical. Let us now turn to the grammatical sentence in (56). From its LF,
(59a), we derive the logical skeleton in (59b). This representation will be assigned
the value False under some variable assignments (e.g., the one that maps v1 to the
property of being male and v2 to the property of being female) and the value True
under others (say, the assignment that maps v1 to the property of being a boy and v2
to the property of being from Spain). Thus, as desired, the sentence in (56) is not
predicted to be ungrammatical.
(58) a. [[some [man [but John]]] arrived]
b. [[some [v1,<e,t> [but v2,<e,t>]]] v3,<e,t>]
(59) a. [[some [male]] [is [female]]]
b. [[some [v1,<e,t>]] [v2,<e,t>]]
For this proposal to apply to the cases we are investigating here, we would need to
assume that modals, aspect, Excl, universal FC items, and ["] all belong to the set of
logical words. Granting this, the LF corresponding to the sentence in (60), namely
(61), would yield the logical skeleton in (62) (I am leaving out type subscripts, to
improve readability). On the analysis proposed here, (62) will come out as false on
every assignment of values to its free variables. If Gajewski is on the right track, this
should be enough to explain the ungrammaticality of (60). The same rationale
applies to the other ungrammatical cases we have considered.
(60) *John must take any card.
(61) ["[must[Exh[John [take [any card]]]]]]
(62) ["[must[Exh[v1 [v2 [any v3]]]]]]
Let us take stock. I have shown that a standard wide scope universal account
of universal FC items fails to capture the FC effect. We have seen that this
problem can be overcome by adding an exclusiveness condition to the semantic
representation. In order to implement this idea, I have claimed that (i) universal FC
items are universal indeterminate pronouns and (ii) the propositional alternatives
19 For recent applications of Gajewski’s proposal see Fox and Hackl (2006), Abrusa´n (2007b, 2008), and




they introduce are mapped into a set of mutually exclusive propositions. The
interaction of these two components accounts for the FC effect, predicts universal20
FC items to be ruled out in episodic and necessity sentences and explains the
obligatory wide scope of the universal quantifier in possibility sentences.
The next section briefly addresses a couple of questions raised by the proposal
above: (i) What is the nature of the universal propositional quantifier? (ii) What
explains the distribution of Excl?
4 Interim questions
4.1 The status of ["]
Kratzer and Shimoyama suggest in passing that the operators indeterminate pro-
nouns associate with may be contributed by inflectional categories ‘‘like ‘episodic’
or ‘generic aspect’, inflectional negation and wh-complementizers’’ (Kratzer and
Shimoyama 2002, 26). On this view, the universal propositional quantifier would
most likely be introduced by generic (imperfective) aspect.21 If this were the case,
cualquiera would be ruled out in episodic sentences like (63) simply because
aspectual morphology does not supply a ["] operator.
(63) *Juan cogio´ cualquiera de las cartas del mazo.
‘Juan took-pfv. any of the cards in the discard pile.’
However, there is ample evidence that generic morphology is not the source of the
propositional universal quantifier. As Dayal (1998) notes for FC any, universal FC
items can occur in sentences that do not involve verbal genericity. Consider, for
instance, the example in (64). While any is licensed in (64a), the indefinite in (64b)
cannot get a generic interpretation.
20 As an anonymous reviewer notes, there are items, like German irgendein, which convey a Free Choice
effect, but whose distribution differs from that of cualquiera or FC any (see, e.g., Kratzer and Shimoyama
2002, Aloni and van Rooij 2007; Chierchia 2006, a.o.). In particular, these items are good in episodic and
necessity sentences, as the following examples illustrate for irgendein.
(ii) Mary musste irgendeinen Mann heiraten.
Mary had-to irgend-one man marry (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, 10)
(iii) Irgendjemand hat angerufen.
irgend-one has called (Haspelmath 1997, 47).
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) argue that irgendein is an existential indeterminate pronoun (that is, an
indeterminate pronoun that must agree with an alternative-selecting existential quantifier) and that the FC
effect it triggers is a domain-widening implicature. On this view, the observed differences in distribution
between cualquiera and irgendein are expected. For instance, on the narrow scope reading of irgendein,
(ii) asserts that in all accessible worlds, there is a man that Mary marries, and implicates that for every
man in the domain there is a distinct world where Mary marries that man. Unlike in the corresponding
sentences with cualquiera, no contradiction arises, and irgendein is licensed. Different paths to Free
Choice, then, may lead to different distributional properties.
21 For the connection between imperfective aspect and universal quantification see, e.g., Bonomi (1997).
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(64) a. You may pick any flower. (Dayal 1998, 435)
b. You may pick a flower. (Dayal 1998, 439)
How is ["] introduced into the representation, then? As anticipated by the discus-
sion in Sect. 3, I would like to suggest that ["] is freely inserted, up to interpret-
ability.22 According to this hypothesis, ["] can be inserted in any place in the
structure in which it (i) can agree with a universal FC item, (ii) can operate over a
set of propositional alternatives, (iii) does not produce a fatal contradiction, and (iv)
does not block agreement between another indeterminate and its corresponding
matching operator (i.e., does not create an intervention effect). In cases like (63)
then, cualquiera has no chance of survival: there is no way of introducing ["] that
would not give rise to a contradiction, and hence, the selectional requirement of
cualquiera cannot be satisfied.
4.2 The distribution of Excl
We have seen that assuming that propositional alternatives get exclusified has a
number of welcome consequences. But what introduces the Excl operator into the
representation? Answering this question turns out not to be an easy task.
One possibility might be to try to tie exclusiveness to the lexical entry of items
like cualquiera by proposing, e.g., that these items must agree with Excl. This view
would square well with the account in Lee (2005), according to which the focus
particle man in Korean signals agreement with a null only operator. However,
hardwiring exclusification into the semantics of universal FC items would yield
wrong results: as we will see in Sect. 5, there are some sentences with universal FC
items that do not involve exclusiveness. What to do then? In her 2005 LSA lectures,
Angelika Kratzer put forward the working hypothesis that propositional alternatives
are always exclusified.23 On this view, Excl would apply as soon as possible after
each introduction of an indeterminate (where ‘as soon as possible’ means ‘as soon
as we obtain propositional alternatives’). But this leaves us with the question of
where this requirement comes from.
Perhaps the introduction of Excl is related to a general condition on alternatives,
e.g., that they must be non-overlapping (see discussion in Zimmermann 2001;
Simons 2005). If this were the case, we would expect Excl to be introduced at every
point where we get propositional alternatives (i.e., at every clausal point). But, as
Danny Fox (p.c.) has pointed out to me, this move would have disastrous conse-
quences, namely that we would predict possibility sentences to be contradictory.
The sentence in (65), for instance, would have the LF in (66), which has contra-
dictory truth conditions (since the universal quantifier at the top of the clause ranges
over a set of mutually exclusive propositions).
22 This possibility was suggested to me by Angelika Kratzer (p.c.).
23 LSA lecture, MIT, July 19, 2005.
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(65) John may take any of these cards.
(66) ["[Excl [may [Excl [John takes any of these cards]]]]]
This shows that we can only have exclusification at the lowest point possible. But
what motivates the introduction of Excl at precisely this place in the structure is still
an open question, which I will have to leave unanswered here.
5 More on necessity sentences
The proposal that I have put forward rules out FC items in necessity sentences
across-the-board, correctly predicting the ungrammaticality of examples like (67).
(67) *Juan tiene que coger cualquiera de estas cartas.
‘Juan must take any of these cards.’
There are, however, necessity sentences that do license FC items, as the examples
below illustrate.
(68) a. Cualquier estudiante debe trabajar duro.
‘Any student must work hard.’
b. Any student must work hard. (Dayal 1998, 435)
(69) a. Cualquier coche tiene que tener cinturo´n de seguridad
‘Any car must have a security belt.’
b. Any car must have security belts. (Aloni 2007a, 83)
This section is devoted to discussing this type of examples. Following work by
Maria Aloni (Aloni 2003, 2007a), I will show how the proposal above can be
modified so as to accommodate these problematic cases.
5.1 Necessity sentences: the role of genericity
We have just seen that, while universal FC items are ruled out in necessity sentences
such as (67) above, there are some necessity sentences that allow these items. The
example in (70), from Aloni (2003, 2007a), is a case in point. Aloni notes that the
plain indefinite in (71), which occurs in the same context as any in (70), can have a
generic reading, and argues that sentences like (70) involve genericity.
(70) Any car must have security belts. (Aloni 2007a, 83)
(71) A car must have security belts. (Aloni 2007a, 83)
Following the discussion in Aloni (2003, 2007a), we can formulate the following
generalization:
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(72) In necessity sentences, universal FC items are licensed only if a plain
indefinite in the same position can get a generic interpretation.
The examples in (73) through (76), from Dayal (1998), support (72). The indefinites
in (73a) and (74a) can be given a generic interpretation: (73a) may be understood as
a generalization over students; (74a) as a generalization over soldiers. Replacing
these indefinites with FC any yields the acceptable sentences (73b) and (74b). In
contrast, the indefinites in (75a) and (76a) can only be interpreted existentially:
(75a) cannot be interpreted as a generalization over flowers, nor can (76a) be
interpreted as a generalization over pilots. In this case, replacing the indefinites with
FC any, as in the corresponding (b)-examples, results in ungrammaticality. (The
same judgments obtain for the corresponding Spanish sentences.)
(73) a. A student must work hard.
b. Any student must work hard.
(74) a. A soldier should be prepared to die for her country.
b. Any soldier should be prepared to die for her country.
(75) a. You must pick a flower.
b. *You must pick any flower.
(76) a. A pilot must be flying this plane.
b. *Any pilot must be flying this plane. (Dayal 1998, 435–438)
This correlation between the availability of generic interpretations for plain inde-
finites and the acceptability of FC items is exactly what Kadmon and Landman’s
(1993) analysis would lead us to expect. According to these authors, any is an
indefinite with some special properties (widening, strengthening). The universal-like
interpretation of FC any comes about via the same operator responsible for the
generic reading of ordinary indefinites. Thus, Kadmon and Landman predict FC any
to appear in precisely the same environments where ordinary indefinites can be
interpreted generically. However, Dayal (1998) has shown that this prediction is not
borne out. As we saw in Sect. 4, FC items are acceptable in possibility sentences
regardless of whether an indefinite could have a generic interpretation in the same
context. This is illustrated by (64), repeated below as (77). (See Dayal 1998 for
more examples and for other arguments against Kadmon and Landman’s account.)
(77) a. You may pick any flower. (Dayal 1998, 435)
b. You may pick a flower. (Dayal 1998, 439)
Aloni (2003, 2007a) puts forward what we could dub a ‘hybrid account’. In her
proposal, modals introduce quantification over sets of propositional alternatives, as
well as quantification over worlds. Possibility modals involve universal quantifi-
cation over alternatives and existential quantification over worlds; necessity modals,
existential quantification over alternatives and universal quantification over worlds.
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In combination with the semantics she proposes for FC any, this derives wide scope
universal readings for possibility sentences and ungrammaticality for necessity
sentences. To account for necessity sentences that do allow any, Aloni proposes that
in those cases it is the generic operator that acts as a licensor, as Kadmon and
Landman would have it. In her 2007a article, she tentatively suggests that all FC
licensing operators might be universal quantifiers over sets of propositional alter-
natives. On this view, the generic operator would involve universal quantification
over both propositional alternatives and worlds.
In what follows, I will adopt Aloni’s claim that in necessity sentences like (70),
(73b), or (74b), the FC item is licensed by the generic operator. I believe that this
proposal can be quite naturally implemented in the account developed in Sects. 2
and 3. On this account, universal FC items are universal indeterminate pronouns,
which must associate with a universal quantifier ranging over propositional alter-
natives. In the framework I am adopting here, the generic operator can be construed
as a universal quantifier over individual alternatives, as in (78), which corresponds
to the universal generalized quantifier in Kratzer and Shimoyama (Kratzer and
Shimoyama 2002, 8).
(78) For [[a]]w,g ˝ De:
[[GEN a]]w,g ¼ {kPkw0("a (a ˛ [[a]]w,g ﬁ P(a)(w0) ¼ 1))}
Of course, this cannot be the whole story! We know that generic quantification is
not universal quantification: A student must work hard, on its generic reading, does
not mean the same as Every student works hard (see, e.g., Krifka et al. 1995 and
references therein). The semantics of the generic operator is a very intricate topic
that I will not be able to address here. As we will see, the only crucial point for
current purposes is that this operator ranges over sets of individual alternatives. In
what follows, I will work with the denotation in (78), for simplicity’s sake.
It seems reasonable to assume that the quantifier in (78) can also satisfy the
selectional requirements of a universal indeterminate. Let us then propose that
universal indeterminate pronouns have two interpretational possibilities:
(i) agreement with the universal quantifier over propositions, as in Sect. 2;
(ii) agreement with the generic operator, construed as a universal quantifier over
individual alternatives.
If we take the route in (i), the semantic composition will proceed as described in
Sects. 2 and 3: The FC item will stay in situ, and the individual alternatives it
introduces will expand and give rise to propositional alternatives, which will then be
exclusified. If we take the route in (ii) instead, the FC item will have to move to a
position where it can combine with GEN, as in (79) below. (I am assuming that
movement triggers the insertion of a binder index right below the moved element, as
in Heim and Kratzer 1998.)
(79) a. Any student must work hard.
b. [[GEN [any student]] [IP21 [IP1must [t1 work hard]]]]
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Applying GEN to the set of individual alternatives denoted by any student yields the
function in (80). In this computation, the individual alternatives contributed by the
FC item are ‘absorbed’ by the generic operator. As a consequence, no propositional
alternatives are generated and, hence, exclusiveness does not come into play.
(80) {kPkw0("x (student0 (x)(w0) ﬁ P(x)(w0)))}
The modified proposal above predicts that the only way for a universal FC item to
survive in a necessity sentence is to agree with the generic operator. In necessity
sentences, association with the propositional quantifier yields a contradiction. In
contrast, no contradiction will arise when the FC item associates with the generic
operator. For instance, the sentence in (79) will denote the (singleton set containing
the) non-contradictory proposition in (81).24
(81) {kw0("x (student0 (x)(w0) ﬁ "w0 (acc(w0)(w00) ﬁ work-hard (x)(w00)))}
Note that, given the assumptions I am making here, it is crucial that the generic
operator quantifies over individual alternatives, as in (78), rather than over propo-
sitional alternatives, as suggested by Aloni (2007a). In cases like You must take any
of these cards, we derive a contradiction because we universally quantify over a set
of mutually exclusive propositions. In cases like (70), quantification over individual
alternatives stops alternative expansion and blocks the creation of propositional
alternatives, thereby eliminating the source of the contradiction.
Since we are taking universal FC items to be indefinites, we expect them to be
able to combine with the generic operator exactly in the same contexts in which
plain indefinites can do so. This accounts for the generalization in (72), repeated
below as (82).
(82) In necessity sentences, universal FC items are licensed only if a plain
indefinite in the same position can get a generic interpretation.
Before closing this section, there is another set of data that we need to consider. Up
till now, we have looked only at sentences where the universal FC item was in
subject position. These cases clearly support the generalization in (82). When we
turn to object cases, judgments become somewhat murkier. Consider, for instance,
the examples in (83) and (84).
(83) a. Tienes que contestar cualquier pregunta.
‘You must answer any question.’
b. You must answer any question.
24 In order to compute the denotation of the constituent that I have labeled IP2, we need to use Kratzer
and Shimoyama’s Predicate Abstraction rule:
(iv) If a is a branching node whose daughters are an index i and b, where [[b]]w,g ˝ Dr, then [[a]]w,g ¼
{f: f ˛ D<er> & "a [f(a) ˛ [[b]]w, g[a/i]]} (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, 8)
54 P. Mene´ndez-Benito
123
(84) a. El portero tiene que saludar a cualquier visitante.
‘The doorman must greet any visitor.’
b. The doorman must greet any visitor.
Both any and cualquiera are acceptable in the necessity sentences above. Thus, the
generalization in (82) predicts that the corresponding indefinite objects (that is, the
indefinites in (85) and (86)) will be able to get a generic interpretation.
(85) a. Tienes que contestar una pregunta.
‘You must answer a question.’
b. You must answer a question.
(86) a. El portero tiene que saludar a un visitante.
‘The doorman must greet a visitor.’
b. The doorman must greet a visitor.
But while this interpretation is possible, it seems harder to obtain than in subject
position, and the extent to which it is available varies across speakers. Why should
that be, if the mechanism that licenses FC items in necessity sentences is the same
that derives generic interpretations for indefinites? While I do not have a fully
satisfactory answer to this question, I would like to at least offer some preliminary
remarks.
Kratzer (1989/1995) argues that, in English, indefinite objects can only get a
generic interpretation if they are able to move covertly to the restriction of the
generic operator.25 Suppose that, in the absence of a context that makes the generic
interpretation salient, speakers prefer to leave the object in situ. If this is the case,
the existential interpretation of the object would be preferred out-of-the-blue.
A similar argument might be made for Spanish objects.
With plain indefinites, leaving the object in its base position is always a pos-
sibility. In contrast, given what I have said so far, in sentences like (83) and (84)
the FC item must move to a position where it can combine with the generic
operator so as to avoid a fatal contradiction. Since the only possible way of
interpreting the FC items in these sentences is to give them a generic reading, we
might expect speakers to get this reading effortlessly.
A problem with this line of explanation is that, at least in Spanish, some speakers
find it hard to get a generic interpretation for (85) and (86) even when given a
suitable context. More research needs to be done in order to establish what factors
affect speakers’ judgments in these cases.
5.2 Consequences for possibility sentences
The proposal in Sect. 2 correctly predicts universal FC items to be licensed in all possi-
bility sentences. As we saw in Sect. 2.3, association with the universal propositional
25 She claims that the objects that can get a generic interpretation in English are the same ones that are
able to scramble overtly in German.
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operator in possibility sentences does not yield contradictory truth conditions, and
therefore it is always an option. While the modification introduced in Sect. 4.1 does not
affect this result, it makes further predictions about the interpretation of possibility sen-
tences.
Consider the sentences in (87) below.
(87) a. Un gato puede cazar ratones.
‘A cat can hunt mice.’
b. A cat can hunt mice.
In both the Spanish and the English versions, the indefinite subject can get a generic
interpretation. Our current hypothesis predicts that a FC item in the same context
should be able to associate with the generic operator. The corresponding structure
will be assigned (roughly) the interpretation in (89).
(88) a. Cualquier gato puede cazar ratones.
‘Any cat can hunt mice.’
b. Any cat can hunt mice.
(89) {that for every combination of cats x, there is an accessible world in
which x hunts mice}
The upshot of this is that sentences like (88) are predicted to be true in situations
where there is no complete freedom of choice. As noted above, if the alternatives
introduced by the FC item combine with the generic operator, no propositional
alternatives will be generated, so there will be no exclusiveness requirement. In
other words, genericity would dilute the freedom of choice component.
There is some initial evidence that this prediction is on the right track. Consider
the following scenario (inspired by the documentary The March of the Penguins).
(90) Every year, during the mating season, Emperor Penguins march for
70 miles until they get to the place where they were born, and where
they now mate and lay eggs. Crucially, all the penguins march together.
This is what they are programmed to do. If a penguin gets lost, the poor
thing will not be able to make it on its own.
Suppose that I have just seen the documentary The March of the Penguins. You
have heard something about the film on the radio, but you are missing crucial
information. We have the following conversation:
(91) You: ¿So´lo los pingu¨inos jo´venes pueden caminar 70 millas?
‘Only the young penguins can walk for 70 miles?’
Me: No, no, cualquier pingu¨ino emperador puede caminar 70 millas.
‘No, no, any emperor penguin can walk for 70 miles.’
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Given the scenario above, my reply is true. But if cualquiera could only agree with
the propositional quantifier, my reply would be predicted to be false. The sentence
in (92) would denote (roughly) the proposition in (93).
(92) Cualquier pingu¨ino puede caminar 70 millas.
‘Any penguin can walk 70 miles.’
(93) {that for every combination of penguins x, there is an accessible world
in which only x marches}
And the proposition in (93) is false in the scenario above. Presumably, the only
accessible worlds are those in which Emperor Penguins are biologically pro-
grammed the way they are in the actual world. And there is no such world in which
a lone penguin marches 70 miles on its own.
In contrast, the paraphrase in (94), which corresponds roughly to the generic
reading, comes out as true in the given scenario.
(94) {that for every combination of penguins x, there is an accessible world in
which x marches}
Thus, the prediction is borne out for the scenario above. Further research is needed
to determine whether this prediction holds more generally.
6 A note on subtrigging
Above, I have proposed that FC items have two interpretational possibilities:
(i) They can associate with a universal quantifier over propositional alternatives.
(ii) They can associate with the operator responsible for generic readings of indefinites.
This correctly predicts FC items to be ruled out in episodic sentences like (95). We have
already seen how option (i) yields contradictory truth conditions for these sentences
(Sect. 2.3.3). And option (ii) is of course not viable in these cases, where verbal mor-
phology blocks a generic interpretation.
(95) Juan hablo´ con cualquier mujer.
‘John talked-pfv. to any woman.’
However, as first observed by LeGrand (1975) and discussed more recently by
Dayal (1998, 2004), any can be rescued in simple past sentences by adding a relative
clause. This is illustrated by the contrast between (96) and (97) below.
(96) *John talked to any woman.
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(97) John talked to any woman he saw.
This strategy, dubbed ‘subtrigging’ by LeGrand (1975), does not seem easily
available in Spanish, where the result of adding a relative clause to (98) is still
marginal, witness (99).26
(98) *Juan hablo´ con cualquier mujer.
‘Juan talked-pfv. to any woman.’
(99) ?? Juan hablo´ con cualquier mujer que se le acercara.
‘Juan talked-pfv. to any woman that came up to him.’
In what follows, I will briefly discuss the possibility that this contrast between the
two languages might follow from the differences between their verbal systems.
English simple past tense can have both episodic and generic interpretations. For
instance, the example in (100) can be used to describe a particular event (episodic
interpretation), or to attribute to the printer the ability of printing documents with
graphics (generic dispositional interpretation).
(100) This printer printed documents with graphics.
As shown by (101) below, FC any is licensed in dispositional sentences.27 In
principle, then, sentences like (100) should license any on their dispositional
reading. In the absence of contextual clues, however, the episodic interpretation of
simple past sentences seems to be much more salient. Since FC any is ruled out in
episodic sentences, sentences like (96) are judged as bad when presented out of the
blue. I hypothesize that adding a relative clause to (100), as in (97), somehow
facilitates a dispositional reading of the main verb (for reasons yet to be under-
stood). Since any is good in dispositional sentences, this results in acceptability.
This way of thinking about English subtrigging fits with an observation by David
Dowty and Dick Oehrle reported in Dayal (1998), namely that the sentence Yes-
terday, John talked to any woman he saw seems ‘‘more a statement about John’s
disposition than about his actual behavior’’ (Dayal 1998, 454). Of course, for my
suggestion to become a full-fledged hypothesis I would need to say exactly how the
relative clause helps the dispositional interpretation. I will have to leave this issue
open for now.
(101) This printer prints any document.
26 This is at odds with Quer’s judgment for the corresponding Catalan sentences (Quer 1998, 2000).
27 Elsewhere (Mene´ndez-Benito 2005), I have argued (building on Dahl 1975) that dispositional sen-




In Spanish, the generic/episodic distinction in the past is marked by aspectual
morphology: in generic sentences, the verb bears imperfective morphology; in
episodic sentences, perfective morphology. For instance, while the imperfective
sentence in (102) can mean that (at some contextually relevant past time) this printer
had the capacity of printing documents with graphics (dispositional interpretation),
the perfective sentence in (103) means that there was at least one episode in which
the printer printed documents with graphics.
(102) Esta impresora imprimı´a documentos con gra´ficos.
‘This printer printed-impf. documents with graphics.’
(103) Esta impresora imprimio´ documentos con gra´ficos.
‘This printer printed-pfv. documents with graphics.’
Hence, if the role of subtrigging is to facilitate a generic reading of the main verb,
we expect this strategy to be blocked in Spanish. That is, cualquiera should be bad
in perfective sentences regardless of whether or not it is modified by a relative
clause. The results of an acceptability rating questionnaire reported in Mene´ndez-
Benito (2005) suggest that this is indeed the case.28 In this study, perfective sen-
tences like (104) were judged as worse than imperfective sentences like (105),
despite the fact that cualquiera is modified by a relative clause in both cases.
(104) Mi primo Juan coqueteo´ con cualquier mujer que le sonriera con
amabilidad.
‘My cousin Juan flirted-pfv. with any woman that smiled at him kindly.’
(105) Mi primo Juan coqueteaba con cualquier mujer que le sonriera con
amabilidad.
‘My cousin Juan flirted-impf. with any woman that smiled at him kindly.’
Additionally, the experimental results reported in Mene´ndez-Benito (2005) can be
taken to suggest that episodic sentences with cualquiera are better when the events
they describe can be easily understood as being the result of a policy or rule (as in
(106)) than when they cannot (107).
(106) La policı´a detuvo a cualquier persona que apoyara al antiguo gobierno
pu´blicamente.
‘The police arrested-pfv. any person that publicly supported the previous
government.’
(107) Mi primo Juan coqueteo´ con cualquier mujer que le sonriera con
amabilidad.
‘My cousin Juan flirted-pfv. with any woman that smiled at him kindly.’
28 See Mene´ndez-Benito (2005) for a detailed presentation of the experiment, including the full list of
experimental items.
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While the results are not conclusive (see Mene´ndez-Benito 2005 for discussion),
they open up the interesting possibility that perceivers can to some extent ‘mimic’
the effect of generic morphology by non-grammatical means and thereby partially
rescue cualquiera in episodic (i.e. perfective) contexts.
If the observed difference between English and Spanish is to be explained along
the lines suggested above, we will expect subtrigging to work only in languages
where the episodic/generic distinction is not overtly marked. This, however, does
not seem to be the case in view of the Italian data reported in Chierchia (2006) and
Aloni (2007b). Italian behaves like Spanish in that the episodic/generic distinction is
marked by aspectual morphology. But, according to Aloni (2007b), the Italian FC
items qualsiasi and qualunque are good in episodic sentences when modified by a
relative clause, but bad when unmodified (on qualsiasi, see also Chierchia 2006).
She gives the following examples:
(108) #Qualsiasi/qualunque donna cadde.
‘Any woman fell.’
(109) Qualsiasi/qualunque donna che provo` a saltare cadde
‘Any woman who tried to jump fell.’
One possibility is that qualsiasi is just not amenable to the proposal presented here.
The Italian data could then be accounted for by the proposal of Aloni (2007b), who
follows Mene´ndez-Benito (2005) in assuming that FC items are universal indeter-
minate pronouns, but claims that these items trigger an operation of exhaustification
more general than the one assumed there. On Aloni’s account, the semantic com-
position delivers universal quantification over mutually exclusive propositions in
the case of ungrammatical sentences like (108), just as in the account presented
here. In contrast, for subtrigged sentences like (109), her proposal derives universal
quantification over a set of compatible propositions. In particular, (109) will be true
if all the propositions in {a fell, b fell, c fell…}—where a, b, c,… are all the women
that tried to jump—are true. That is, (109) will be interpreted as ‘Every woman that
tried to jump fell’. Under this account, the Italian judgments would be explained,
but we would then need an explanation for why subtrigging is not fully available in
Spanish.29
Before we conclude that Italian and Spanish are radically different with respect to
subtrigging, a note of caution is in order. While experimental evidence shows that
subtrigged sentences are not completely acceptable in Spanish, Mene´ndez-Benito
(2005) suggests that partial repairs might be available. If this suggestion is on the
right track, we might expect gradient judgments and variability across speakers.
Hence, in order to determine the status of subtrigging in Italian, it may be necessary
to gather data experimentally, controlling for factors that could affect the
29 The reader is referred to Aloni’s work for the details of her proposal. For another recent account of
subtrigging, see Jayez and Tovena (2007).
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acceptability of subtrigged sentences. This is a task that I will have to leave for
further research.
7 Concluding remarks and issues for further research
Back in 1967, Zeno Vendler noted that an essential feature of items like any was their
ability to convey freedom of choice. The starting point for the analysis I have proposed
here is the observation that wide scope universal quantification is not enough to
capture this freedom of choice component. To guarantee Free Choice, we must add an
exclusiveness condition to the standard universal paraphrases. I have argued that
this idea can be very naturally implemented in Kratzer and Shimoyama’s Hamblin
semantics, by claiming that (i) FC items of the any-type are universal indeterminate
pronouns (they have to agree with a universal quantifier) and (ii) the propositional
alternatives they generate are mapped into a set of mutually exclusive propositions.
As we have seen, the interaction of these two components yields the desired FC effect.
The basic proposal that derives the FC effect in possibility sentences goes a long
way toward deriving the puzzling distribution of universal FC items: it automati-
cally rules out episodic sentences like *You took any of these cards, necessity
sentences like *You must take any of these cards, and configurations where the
universal quantifier has narrow scope with respect to a possibility modal. The
acceptability of necessity sentences like Any student must work hard will also be
accounted for if FC items can associate with the generic operator, construed as a
universal quantifier over individual alternatives.
Many questions remain, of course. My tentative discussion of subtrigging, in
particular, raises a number of issues. First of all, for my suggestion about the
English-Spanish contrast to be seriously entertained, it would have to be supple-
mented with an explanation of why relative clauses might facilitate the dispositional
reading. Second, following Mene´ndez-Benito (2005), I have briefly noted that, in
Spanish, some subtrigged sentences seem to be better than others, the relevant factor
being whether the events described can be easily understood as the result of a policy
or rule. The nature and degree of availability of this type of partial repair needs to be
investigated further. Finally, we need to probe into the crosslinguistic status of
subtrigging—to what extent and under which conditions do different languages
allow this strategy?
Another question concerns adverbs like maybe and perhaps. While these adverbs
seem to convey existential quantification over worlds, they do not license universal
FC items. The contrast between existential modal adverbs and existential modal
auxiliaries is illustrated in (110).30
30 Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer, Nathan Klinedinst, and an anonymous reviewer for (independently)
pointing out this problem to me.
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(110) a. #Maybe/perhaps John took any of the cards from this deck.
b. John can take any of the cards from this deck.
How can we account for the ungrammaticality of (110) within the limits of the
proposal I have put forward? While I do not have an answer to this question, I would
like to briefly sketch a couple of potential ways to go.
As noted in Sect. 2, the analysis I have presented here predicts that only exis-
tentials that allow alternatives to project up the tree will rescue universal FC items.
Thus, one possibility would be to try to argue that the scope of modal adverbs is
closed by an existential propositional operator. As noted before, this would create an
intervention effect, which would lead to ungrammaticality. Further research would
of course be needed to determine whether this possibility is at all viable.
Alternatively, one could assume that, unlike modal auxiliaries, modal adverbs are
forced to appear above the " operator, as in (111).
(111) [maybe [" [Excl [John took any of these cards]]]]
As we saw in Sect. 3, this LF would be assigned contradictory truth conditions
(since the complement of the modal element denotes the contradictory proposition),
which would render the corresponding sentence ungrammatical. Of course, pursuing
this line would amount to abandoning the claim that the universal quantifier can
freely be inserted up to interpretability and would therefore require us to investigate
more closely what the distributional properties of this quantifier are.
A more general question is how the analysis put forward here fares when applied
to other constructions involving FC items, such as conditionals, imperatives, or
comparatives. I hope to be able to address this question in future work.
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